We explain what the policy means, and why the ambiguity is required
go, it seemed clear enough. Asked at a press conference in Tokyo on May 23rd whether America would get involved militarily, President Joe Biden replied: “Yes…That’s the commitment we made.” But American officials were quick to explain that this apparently unambiguous commitment to Taiwan’s defence was nothing of the sort: it constituted no departure at all from America’s long-standing Taiwan policy, which is often summed up as one of leaving its options open, dubbed “strategic ambiguity”.
The one-China policy and the three joint communiqués refer to agreements reached by China and America between 1972 and 1982. In 1972 Richard Nixon visited China, ending the two countries’ long estrangement, during which America recognised the government in Taipei as the legitimate ruler of all of China .
China was incensed at what it saw as continued American meddling, and kept up the pressure on America to weaken its support of Taiwan, securing a commitment in 1982 that America would gradually reduce its arms sales to Taiwan. The commitment has not been honoured, but to sugar the pill at the time America made “six assurances” to Taiwan, promising, among other things, that it would not set a date for ending arms supplies, and would not repeal the TRA.